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Abstract
My thesis analyzes various types of uncertainties and their e¤ects on nancial
fragility in the context of information asymmetries and bank-run models. When
various generations of currency crisis are considered, it is observed that the nancial
system and fragilities associated with it plays a critical role in more recent crisis
episodes. Therefore, focusing on the nancial system can possibly lead to a better
understanding of how and why these crises took place. The analysis presented here
aims to provide some new insights about this topic. In the rst chapter, I tried
to analyze how public borrowing can a¤ect nancial fragility when how a private
bank nances its lending to the government is private information. I built a simple
theoretical model where the government basically borrows from a commercial bank.
The objective of the government is to realize borrowing at the lowest possible cost
but at the same time it cares about the nancial stability. The risk-averse com-
mercial bank, on the other hand, maximizes utility by allocating the nancing of
its lending among a safe and a risky loan where the amount it uses from the safe
source considered to be a measure of nancial stability. Moral hazard arises as the
amount of safe loan used is not observable to the government. Under the assump-
tion that the risk premium is decreasing in income, I show, when the government is
not able push the rate down below a certain level, it can trade a rise in borrowing
costs with some nancial stability. In other words, although pushing the rate down
is good both for borrowing costs and nancial stability, under asymmetric informa-
tion, it may be optimal to design a contract with a reward scheme and accept a
higher cost for borrowing for a relatively more reliable nancial system. This chap-
ter contributes to the literature by identifying a potential moral hazard problem
in the process of public borrowing and displays how it can lead to a higher than
optimal level of nancial fragility when the economic policy gets obsessed with low-
ering the borrowing costs. The analysis provided is also interesting as it displays an
unusual case where the borrower rather than the lender faces issues resulting from
asymmetric information. In the second chapter, a bank-run model used to analyze
e¤ects of uncertainty on nancial fragility in terms of maturity mismatch. I use
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an extended version of the well-known Diamond and Dybvig model by introducing
short term borrowing where the future cost of borrowing is unknown. This creates
an additional source of maturity mismatch and the demand deposit contracts are
now vulnerable to both depositor and lender panics. The key is when the borrowing
and investment decisions are made the total cost of borrowing is unknown but the
deposit contract can be written contingent on this cost. This creates di¤erent con-
sumption paths for patient and impatient agents and they bear di¤erent degrees of
interest rate risk. The characterization of the contract shows interest risk is mainly
borne by early consumers particularly for higher roll over costs. In times of crisis
the most liquid funds are the ones that are used rst and hence consumers who need
urgent liquidity su¤ers most. The main contribution of this part is that, it combines
a bank run model with aggregate uncertainty with short-term borrowing. It also
sheds some light on the dynamics of nancial problems in developing countries. The
last chapter analyzes risk sharing under private banking. Once again a version of
Diamond and Dybvig framework is used. Instead of assuming a banking structure
where consumers form a union to achieve optimal risk sharing, I consider a private
bank that maximizes prots. I analyze the deposit contract under di¤erent assump-
tions about how the bank and the depositors consider the probability of a bank run.
The original Diamond and Dybvig model, implicitly assumes the probability of a
bank-run is su¢ ciently small to ensure participation. With a private bank, I allow
partial participation and optimizing depositors automatically establish individual
rationality. This leads to a supply of deposits (or demand for risk sharing function)
which varies along with the payments o¤ered in the contract. Therefore, the bank
faces a trade-o¤ between the rates it o¤er and the amount of deposits it can attract.
This basically leads a new set of equilibrium contracts to come out which are not
possible under standard risk sharing. Depending on the risk averseness of the con-
sumers these alternative contracts produce di¤erent levels of nancial fragility. This
last chapter contributes to the literature by considering the possible risk sharing
contracts under a prot maximizing monopolistic commercial bank. It also briey
discusses how this may a¤ect nancial fragility.
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